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A SOBER SECOND THOUGHT
Andrew H. Schapiro*
1. INTRODUCTION
By the year 1994-his twenty-fourth on the Supreme
Court-Justice Harry Blackmun was a liberal icon, not only for
his authorship and defense of Roe v. Wade,' but also because of
his forceful dissents from many of the Rehnquist Court's right-
leaning decisions in other areas. So his renunciation that year of
the death penalty in Callins v. Collins,2 while newsworthy and
notable, would not have struck the casual observer as out of
character or inconsistent with his jurisprudence. But from the
vantage point of 1972-when Justice Blackmun was among the
dissenters in Furman v. Georgia3 -Callins could hardly be more
surprising. Justice Blackmun's journey from Furman to Callins
is the remarkable and instructive story of a Justice reluctantly
concluding that the Court's quest for a constitutionally
acceptable and administratively manageable death penalty, a
quest in which he had been a principal participant, could not
succeed.
The evolution of Justice Blackmun's capital jurisprudence
proceeded in three stages. From 1972 until 1986, he was, to use
his famous phrase from Callins, "tinker[ing] with the machinery
of death,"4 seemingly convinced that if only the right set of rules
could be developed the Constitution would be satisfied--despite
his personal opposition to capital punishment. The period from
*Partner, Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart & Sullivan. A former law clerk to Supreme Court
Justice Harry Blackmun and to Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, Mr. Schapiro is a
graduate of Harvard Law School and Yale College. He wishes to thank Elizabeth
Rosenshine, a third-year student at Fordham Law School, for her valuable assistance.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. Id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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1987 through 1991 can be described as one of disillusionment.
Justice Blackmun became more receptive to petitioners'
arguments in capital cases and increasingly voiced skepticism
about the constitutional adequacy of purported safeguards
against arbitrariness, racism, and factual error. The final phase,
from 1991 until his opinion in Callins in 1994, was one of
dismay. Justice Blackmun dissented in every significant capital
case, and spoke out more sharply against the direction that the
Court was taking.
Justice Blackmun identified three fundamental concerns in
Callins that led him to give up on the death penalty. The primary
one was the impossibility of reconciling the constitutional
requirements that capital sentencing be both individualized and
non-arbitrary. The insidious influence of race added to the
problem. And the evisceration of the safeguard of habeas corpus
pushed him across the line. In retrospect the development of
each theme is visible in his decisions on capital cases from the
1970s to the 1990s.
II. BACKGROUND: THE FURMAN DISSENT
Justice Blackmun's personal feelings about the death
penalty were never any secret. In Furman he wrote a separate
dissent to offer a set of "somewhat personal comments":
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony
of the spirit. I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste,
antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty,
with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of
moral judgment exercised by finite minds. That distaste is
buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no
useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates
childhood's training and life's experiences, and is not
compatible with the philosophical convictions I have been
able to develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of
"reverence for life." Were I a legislator, I would vote
against the death penalty for the policy reasons argued by
counsel for the respective petitioners and expressed and
adopted in the several opinions filed by the Justices who
vote to reverse these judgments .
5
5. Furman, 408 U.S. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND THE DEATH PENALTY
But when considering the legal arguments in Furman, Justice
Blackmun was acutely conscious of his role as a judge:
I do not sit on these cases, however, as a legislator,
responsive, at least in part, to the will of constituents. Our
task here, as must so frequently be emphasized and re-
emphasized, is to pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation that has been enacted and that is challenged.
This is the sole task for judges. We should not allow our
personal preferences as to the wisdom of legislative and
congressional action, or our distaste for such action, to
guide our judicial decision in cases such as these. The
temptations to cross that policy line are very great. In fact,
as today's decision reveals, they are almost irresistible.
He concluded by reiterating the distinction between personal
preference and constitutional command:
Although personally I may rejoice at the Court's result, I
find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter of history,
of law, or of constitutional pronouncement. I fear the Court
has overstepped. It has sought and has achieved an end.
7
In the decade and a half that followed, Justice Blackmun would
try to apply the Constitution to uphold capital sentencing
schemes, and would often return to the mantra that the Court
ought not second-guess legislative decisions.
III. 1976 - 1986: TINKERING WITH THE MACHINERY OF DEATH
When the Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v.
Georgia, Justice Blackmun wrote simply "I concur in the
judgment." 9 That same Term, he dissented from a decision that
would ultimately become not only a pillar of the Court's death-
penalty jurisprudence but also, two decades later, an important
part of his own analysis in Callins: Woodson v. North
Carolina.10 In Woodson the Court held the mandatory
imposition of the death penalty unconstitutional because
6. Id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 414 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
9. Id. at 227 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 405-414
(Blackmun J., dissenting), 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 414 (Powell, J., dissenting), 465
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
10. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
removing the jury's sentencing discretion was not a proper
response to the problem identified in Furman: arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty. The Court held that death
cannot be constitutionally imposed without "consideration of
relevant facets of the character and record of the individual
offender" and "the circumstances of the particular offense.""
Failure to do so, the majority wrote, "treats all persons convicted
of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings,
but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.',' 2 But
Justice Blackmun dissented, citing to his own opinion in
Furman as well as the other dissenting opinions written by
Justices Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist.'
3
Nor did Justice Blackmun join the plurality's decision in
Lockett v. Ohio.14 There the plurality took the position that the
mitigating factors the Ohio statute permitted to be considered
were too limited; the statute was unconstitutional because it did
not sufficiently permit individualized considerations. The
plurality concluded that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death.
15
In other words, "an individualized decision is essential in capital
cases."'
16
Justice Blackmun, however, was unwilling to go as far as
did the plurality, and would have held Ohio's death-penalty
statute unconstitutional for reasons that he described as "more
limited.'1 7 First, he allowed that imposition of the death penalty
for aiding-and-abetting-type crimes could be unconstitutional as
applied, where the statute forbids the sentencer to consider the
11. Id. at 304.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 307-08.
14. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
15. Id. at 604 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 605.
17. Id. at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
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defendant's "extent of . . .involvement, or the degree of.
mens red."
18
He also expressed concern that the Ohio statute permitted a
trial court judge to dismiss aggravating factors and impose a life
sentence "in the interests of justice" where the defendant
pleaded guilty or no contest, but not where a defendant insisted
on a jury trial. 19 The practical result was that a defendant who
pleaded not guilty "endure[d] a semimandatory ... capital-
sentencing provision," whereas the defendant who pleaded
guilty or no contest faced "a purely discretionary" sentencing
20provision.
But what is striking about Lockett is the extent to which
Justice Blackmun seemed conflicted-even apologetic-about
impinging on Ohio's prerogatives in any way:
Though heretofore I have been unwilling to interfere with
the legislative judgment of the States in regard to capital-
sentencing procedures . . . adhered to in the 1976 cases, ....
this Court's judgment as to disproportionality in Coker,
supra, in which I joined, and the unusual degree to which
Ohio requires capital punishment of a mere aider and
abettor in an armed felony resulting in a fatality even where
no participant specifically intended the fatal use of a
weapon, . . . provides a significant occasion for setting
some limit to the method by which the States assess
punishment for actions less immediately connected to the
deliberate taking of human life.
2 1
Justice Blackmun was still reluctant to second-guess a
state's statutory regime when the Court decided Eddings v.
Oklahoma,22 in which the Court held that because capital
punishment must be "imposed fairly and with reasonable
consistency" to satisfy Lockett, a sentencer may not be
precluded from considering any aspect of the defendant's
character, the record, or any circumstances around the offense
that the defendant identifies a mitigating factor that might
18. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
19. Id. at 618 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment). This
argument had been raised by the petitioner, but not reached by the plurality. Id. at 617
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
20. Id at 619 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
21. Id. at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
22. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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provide a basis for imposing a lesser sentence.23 But Justice
Blackmun joined the dissenters in asserting that the statute in
question complied with Lockett, and argued that it was for the
state to decide what weight is to be given to any evidence of
mitigation. 24
Spaziano v. Florida,25  for which Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court, evidenced his continuing
willingness to uphold state sentencing schemes during this
period. Spaziano approved a regime in which the trial judge had
the discretion to override a jury's recommendation of a life
sentence and impose death. Justice Blackmun ruled that the fact
that statutes give this determination to juries in a majority of
jurisdictions where capital punishment is available did not
necessitate the conclusion that "contemporary standards of
fairness and decency are offended by the jury override."
26
Moreover, because there was no indication that the jury override
resulted in discriminatory or arbitrary application of the death
sentence, it did not violate the reliability requirement.
27
Similar questions produced a similar result the following
year, when Justice Blackmun delivered the Court's opinion in
Baldwin v. Alabama.28 Alabama's death-penalty statute, which
required a jury to "fix the punishment at death" if it convicted of
certain aggravated crimes, was not unconstitutional, he
explained, because the statute provided for the trial judge to
weigh mitigating and aggravating circumstances when
determining whether to accept the jury's recommendation, and
the Alabama appellate courts had interpreted the statute to
require judges to impose punishment "without regard to the
jury's mandatory 'sentence."' 29 This interpretation persuaded
Justice Blackmun that "while the specter of a mandatory death
sentence may have made juries more prone to acquit, thereby
benefiting the two defendants acquitted, it did not render
Alabama's scheme unconstitutionally arbitrary."
30
23. Id. at 113-14.
24. Id. at 120 (Burger, C.J., White, Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
25. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
26. Id. at 464.
27. Idat 466-67.
28. 472 U.S. 372 (1985).
29. Id. at 383.
30. Id. at 388-89.
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As of the mid-1980s, therefore, Justice Blackmun was still
finding ways to uphold state sentencing schemes with regularity.
Whatever qualms he may have had about capital punishment did
not translate into concern about its constitutionality. That began
to change, however, in the second half of that decade.
IV. 1987 - 1991: DISILLUSIONMENT
The Court underwent substantial changes in personnel and
politicization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. William
Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice when Warren Burger
retired. Justice Scalia filled the open seat. Anthony Kennedy
replaced Justice Powell; Justice Brennan was replaced by Justice
Souter; and Clarence Thomas replaced Justice Marshall. During
these years Justice Blackmun's reluctance to find fault with
capital sentencing schemes and his tendency to defer to the
states declined markedly.
Justice Blackmun dissented, for example, in California v.
Brown,31 in which the Court rejected a challenge to an
instruction to the jury that it "must not be swayed by mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public
opinion or public feeling" when deciding upon a sentence.
32
Considering the "special role of mercy in capital sentencing and
the stark finality of the death sentence," Justice Biackmun was
unwilling to accept the possibility that "when. . . a jury member
is moved to be merciful to the defendant, an instruction telling
the juror that he or she cannot be 'swayed' by sympathy may
well arrest or restrain this human response, with truly fatal
consequences for the defendant.,
33
Writing in broad and philosophical terms, he observed that
"[w]hile the sentencer's decision to accord life to a defendant at
times might be a rational or moral one, it also may arise from the
defendant's appeal to the sentencer's sympathy or mercy, human
qualities that are undeniably emotional in nature."34 And he
continued in a similar vein:
31. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
32. Id.. at 539.
33. Id. at 563 (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
34. Id. at 561-62 (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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In my view, we adhere so strongly to our belief that
sentencers should have the opportunity to spare a capital
defendant's life on account of compassion for the
individual because, recognizing that the capital sentencing
decision must be made in the context of "contemporary
values," we see in the sentencer's expression of mercy a
distinctive feature of our society that we deeply value.
35
Later that same Term, the Court decided a case that
arguably marks the turning point in Justice Blackmun's
approach to capital cases. In McCleskey v. Kemp 36 the Court
held that a study demonstrating racial discrepancies in Georgia's
application of the death penalty did not prove that the Georgia
system was "arbitrary or capricious in application."37 The racial
variance, the Court held, did "not constitute a major systemic
defect," for "[t]he Constitution does not require that a State
eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a
potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice
system that includes capital punishment."
38
Justice Blackmun was appalled. His dissent featured sharp
rhetoric and a tone of disillusionment that came to characterize
his subsequent death-penalty writings. A conviction should be
set aside, he wrote, when "discrimination in the administration
of the criminal justice system is established., 39 He rejected the
suggestion that relief ought not be granted because it "could lead
to further constitutional challenges," calling that argument "the
most disturbing aspect of [the majority's] opinion." 40 He
questioned the factual basis for the concern, and asserted that in
any event "narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants is
not too high a price to pay for a death penalty system that does
not discriminate on the basis of race.
4 1
Yet Justice Blackmun was not ready to reject the death
penalty itself. He continued to look for guidance and rules likely
to resolve the problems identified in McCleskey, stating that "the
establishment of guidelines for Assistant District Attorneys as to
35. Id. at 562-63 (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
36. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
37. Id. at 308 (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 319.
39. Id. at 348 (Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens & Brennan, JJ. dissenting).
40. Id. at 365 (Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens & Brennan, JJ. dissenting).
41. Id. (Blackmun, Marshall & Stevens, JJ. dissenting).
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the appropriate basis for exercising their discretion at the various
steps in the prosecution of a case would provide at least a
measure of consistency. ' 4 2 Even so, however, he expressed
discouragement and concern:
The Court today sanctions the execution of a man despite
his presentation of evidence that establishes a
constitutionally intolerable level of racially based
discrimination leading to the imposition of his death
sentence. I am disappointed with the Court's action not
only because of its denial of constitutional guarantees to
petitioner McCleskey individually, but also because of its
departure from what seems to me to be well-developed
constitutional jurisprudence.
43
In the years that followed McCleskey, Justice Blackmun
became more comfortable joining colleagues' harsh dissents in
capital cases. In Payne v. Tennessee,44 for example, the Court
overruled two prior decisions to hold that "if the State chooses
to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and
prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment
erects no per se bar."
45
Justice Marshall wrote a scathing dissent, which Justice
Blackmun did not hesitate to join. The dissent opined that there
had been no factual or legal changes to support overruling the
prior decisions--only changes to court personnel-and lamented
the creation of a "radical new exception to the doctrine of stare
decisis" with "staggering" implications.46 Justice Blackmun also
joined Justice Stevens's dissent, which argued that the Court's
substantive decision sharply departed from existing death-
penalty jurisprudence, which previously had "required that any
decision to impose the death penalty be based solely on the
evidence that tends to inform the jury about the character of the
offense and the character of the defendant.
4 7
In cases such as Brown, McCleskey, and Payne, Justice
Blackmun demonstrated a new willingness to find fault with
capital sentences and greater openness to the use of sharp
42. Id. (Blackmun, Marshall & Stevens, JJ. dissenting).
43. Id. at 345 (Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens & Brennan, JJ. dissenting).
44. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
45. Id. at 827.
46. Id. at 845 (Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
47. Id. at 856 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
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language in dissent. His qualms about encroaching on state
prerogatives took a back seat to his concern about the Court's
readiness to uphold sentencing schemes against challenges that
he found meritorious. Most of all he appeared to lose faith in his
colleagues' good faith and commitment to enforce the
Constitution in death-row prisoners' cases.
V. 1991-94: DISMAY
Justice Blackmun's death-penalty writings crossed from
discouragement to dismay during the period from 1991 through
1994. He worried about the erosion of safeguards such as habeas
review. Indeed, in Sawyer v. Whitley,4 Justice Blackmun
suggested that restrictions on habeas review were causing him to
re-think the constitutionality of the death penalty altogether:
I also write separately to express my ever-growing
skepticism that, with each new decision from this Court
constricting the ability of the federal courts to remedy
constitutional errors, the death penalty really can be
imposed fairly and in accordance with the requirements of
the Eighth Amendment.
49
Justice Blackmun sounded a similar note in Coleman v.
Thompson,50 in which the Court held that claims presented for
the first time in a state habeas proceeding are not subject to
review in federal habeas proceedings. His language was severe:
[T]he Court today continues its crusade to erect petty
procedural barriers in the path of any state prisoner seeking
review of his federal constitutional claims. Because I
believe that the Court is creating a Byzantine morass of
48. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
49. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Sawyer the Court considered the
circumstances under which, for habeas purposes, a petitioner can establish "actual
innocence." The Court held that the merits of a "successive, abusive, or defaulted federal
habeas claim" could be heard only if the petitioner showed "that, but for a constitutional
error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty
under the applicable state law"-an exception that applies when a petitioner has shown that
he is 'actually innocent."' Id. at 335. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun wrote that "the
Court today adopts an unduly cramped view of 'actual innocence"' that could preclude the
review of some meritorious claims. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
50. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the
vindication of federal rights, I dissent.
51
Two other dissents from this period warrant note. In Arave
v. Creech,52 Justice Blackmun took the majority to task for
approving an Idaho sentencing scheme that permitted the jury to
impose the death penalty upon finding that a defendant had
displayed "utter disregard for human life. The majority found
that the utter-disregard test provided meaningful guidance
because it could be read to mean cold-blooded.54 With a tone of
exasperation and even sarcasm, Justice Blackmun's dissent
walked through examples in which murders of every type
imaginable had been described as cold-blooded-crimes of
passion and premeditated crimes; crimes in which the defendant
had shown emotion and crimes in which he had not; crimes
motivated by hate and those born of indifference-explaining
that the metaphor cold-blooded failed "to provide meaningful
guidance to the sentencer as required by the Constitution."
55
And in Herrera v. Collins,56 in which the Court held that a
claim of actual innocence does not entitle a petitioner to seek
federal habeas relief, Justice Blackmun penned an impassioned
dissent. "Nothing," he said, "could be more contrary to
contemporary standards of decency,.... or more shocking to the
conscience, . . . than to execute a person who is actually
innocent., 57 Indeed, "even a prisoner who appears to have had
a constitutionally perfect trial 'retains a powerful and legitimate
interest in obtaining his release from custody if he is innocent of
the charge for which he was incarcerated.' ' 58 Justice Blackmun
pulled no punches in calling out what he perceived to be the
Court's hostility to habeas review:
[H]aving held that a prisoner who is incarcerated in
51. Id. at 758-59 (Blackmun, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
52. 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
53. Id. at 465.
54. Id. at 475-76.
55. Id. at 479 (Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); see also id at 483-84 (Blackmun
& Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (reviewing press accounts of so-called "cold-blooded" murders).
56. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
57. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406
(1986), and Rochin v. Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
58. Id. at 438-39 (Blackmun, Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986)) (emphasis in original).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
violation of the Constitution must show he is actually
innocent to obtain relief, the majority would now hold that
a prisoner who is actually innocent must show a
constitutional violation to obtain relief The only principle
that would appear to reconcile these two positions is the
principle that habeas relief should be denied whenever
possible.
59
Then he concluded with a stark statement: "The execution of a
person who can show that he is innocent comes perilously close
to simple murder."
60
VI. DISAPPOINTMENT AND RESIGNATION
By the end of the Court's 1992-93 Term, Justice Blackmun
had given up hope that the Court could reconcile the need for
both individualized sentencing determinations and non-arbitrary
application of capital punishment. At the same time, he had
concluded that the Court was steadily dismantling the
protections that habeas review provided for death-row prisoners.
He might still have felt constrained to defer to the states and to
treat the federal courts' role as limited, as he had in his early
years on the Court, but he had lost any illusion that simply
letting the states do as they saw fit would produce a
constitutionally permissible sentencing regime. He also seemed
to have concluded that some of his colleagues were taking
something other than a neutral approach to deciding capital
cases, and that their rulings were result-oriented.
Against this backdrop, as has been documented
elsewhere,6' Justice Blackmun informed his clerks at the
beginning of the 1993-94 Term that he was ready to renounce
the death penalty. He asked them to watch for a suitable vehicle,
and on February 22, 1994, he issued his dissent from the denial
of certiorari in Callins:
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the
death penalty must be imposed fairly, and with reasonable
consistency, or not at all,.. . and, despite the effort of the
59. Id. at 439 (Blackmun, Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
60. Id. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun s Supreme Court
Journey 176-79 (Times Books 2005).
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States and courts to devise legal formulas and procedural
rules to meet this daunting challenge, the death penalty
remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice,
and mistake. This is not to say that the problems with the
death penalty today are identical to those that were present
20 years ago. Rather, the problems that were pursued down
one hole with procedural rules and verbal formulas have
come to the surface somewhere else, just as virulent and
pernicious as they were in their original form. Experience
has taught us that the constitutional goal of eliminating
arbitrariness and discrimination from the administration of
death ... can never be achieved without compromising an
equally essential component of fundamental fairness-
individualized sentencing.
62
As a result, Justice Blackmun declared, "[fjrom this day
forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.,
63
He explained:
For more than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have
struggled-along with a majority of this Court, to develop
procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than
the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty
endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the Court's
delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved
and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and
intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death
penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self evident to
me now that no combination of procedural rules or
substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty
from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic
question-does the system accurately and consistently
determine which defendants "deserve" to die?--cannot be
answered in the affirmative. It is not simply that this Court
has allowed vague aggravating circumstances to be
employed, . . . relevant mitigating evidence to be
disregarded,.., and vital judicial review to be blocked ....
The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and
moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly
kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair,
62. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(internal citations omitted).
63. Id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
consistent, and reliable sentences of death required by the
Constitution.
64
The difficulty of accommodating both the need for
individualized sentencing and the requirement of avoiding
arbitrariness was at the heart of Justice Blackmun's decision in
Callins, for "the consistency promised in Furman and the
fairness to the individual demanded in Lockett are not only
inversely related, but irreconcilable in the context of capital
punishment. ' 65 He pointed out that "[a]ll efforts to strike an
appropriate balance between these conflicting constitutional
commands are futile because there is a heightened need for both
in the administration of death.",6 6 He described this conflict in
some detail, pointing out that removing arbitrariness from the
process "would also restrict the sentencer's discretion to such an
extent that the sentencer would be unable to give full
consideration to the unique characteristics of each defendant and
the circumstances of the offense," but that leaving "the sentencer
with sufficient discretion to consider fully and act upon the
unique circumstances of each defendant would 'thro[w] open the
back door to arbitrary and irrational sentencing. "
67
Justice Blackmun had, in short, concluded that he could not
accommodate either of these core constitutional values without
compromising the other. And, as he put it,
the proper course when faced with irreconcilable
constitutional commands is not to ignore one or the other,
nor to pretend that the dilemma does not exist, but to admit
the futility of the effort to harmonize them. This means
accepting the fact that the death penal% cannot be
administered in accord with our Constitution.
But Justice Blackmun's concerns were not just with legal
theory. His loss of faith in the Court itself was unmistakable. He
wrote that
the Court has chosen to deregulate the entire enterprise,
replacing, it would seem, substantive constitutional
64. Id. at 1145-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (footnotes and
internal citations omitted).
65. Id. at 1155 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
66. Id.
67. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Graham v. Collins,
506 U.S. 461,494 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
68. Id. at 1157 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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requirements with mere esthetics, and abdicating its
statutorily and constitutionally imposed duty to provide
meaningful judicial oversight to the administration of death
by the States.
69
Continuing, he noted in particular his "belief that this Court
would not enforce the death penalty (even if it could) in
accordance with the Constitution," and characterized that belief
as "buttressed by the Court's 'obvious eagerness to do away
with any restriction on the States' power to execute whomever
and however they please.'"70 He reminded his colleagues that he
had been willing for years to uphold the death penalty because
he had always understood that "certain procedural safeguards,
chief among them the federal judiciary's power to reach and
correct claims of constitutional error on federal habeas review,
would ensure that death sentences are fairly imposed.",71 But, he
pointed out, he had in the end
grown increasingly skeptical that "the death penalty really
can be imposed fairly and in accordance with the
requirements of the Eighth Amendment," given the now
limited ability of the federal courts to remedy constitutional
errors.
72
And then there was the issue of race. Justice Blackmun
recognized that "[e]ven under the most sophisticated death
penalty statutes, race continues to play a major role in
determining who shall live and who shall die.",73 He was deeply
troubled by the knowledge "that the biases and prejudices that
infect society generally would influence the determination of
who is sentenced to death ... so long as the sentencer is free to
exercise unbridled discretion ... and thereby to discriminate.,
74
69. Id at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
70. Id. at 1157 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Herrera,
506 U. S. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
71. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley,
505 U. S. 333, 351, 358 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
72. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Sawyer, 505 U.S. at
351).
73. Id at 1153 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
74. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citations omitted).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Justice Blackmun spent two decades wrestling with not
only the workability of the death penalty, but also the propriety
of close federal judicial review of state sentencing regimes. In
Callins he addressed the latter question by quoting approvingly
from Justice Brennan's dissent in McCleskey:
Those whom we would banish from society or from the
human community itself often speak in too faint a voice to
be heard above society's demand for punishment. It is the
particular role of courts to hear these voices, for the
Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not
alone dictate the conditions of social life. The Court thus
fulfills, rather than disrupts, the scheme of separation of
powers by closely scrutinizing the imposition of the death
penalty, for no decision of a society is more deserving of
"sober second thought."'75
Upon subjecting his views on the constitutionality of
capital punishment to a "sober second thought," Justice
Blackmun ultimately concluded that there could be no
constitutional death penalty. Justices Brennan and Marshall,
who had maintained even after Gregg that the death penalty is
unconstitutional in all cases, had left the Court by the time of
Callins, and so Justice Blackmun-who had dissented in
Furman, who had spent years preaching the gospel of deference
to the states, and who had struggled mightily to find appropriate
limiting principles for a constitutional death penalty-found
himself at last the sole Justice on the Court holding the
abolitionist position.
75. Id. at 1155 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 343
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States,
50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 25 (1936)).
